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Abstract 
This paper examines advisor choice decisions by publicly traded REITs and listed property 
companies in Asia-Pacific real estate markets. Using a sample of 168 firms, we find robust 
evidence that firms strategically evaluate and compare the increased agency costs associated 
with external advisement against the potential benefits associated with collocating decision 
rights with location specific soft information. Our empirical results reveal real estate companies 
tend to hire external advisors when they invest in countries: 1) that are more economically and 
politically unstable, 2) whose legal system is based on civil law, 3) where the level of corruption 
is perceived to be high, and 4) when disclosure is relatively poor. Additionally, we find the 
probability of retaining an external advisor is directly related to the expected agency costs. 
Lastly, we find evidence of return premiums in excess of 13 % for firms whose organizational 
structure matches their investment profile. As such, we conclude that the decision to hire an 
external advisor represents a value relevant trade-off between the costs and benefits of this 
organizational arrangement. 
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Introduction 
Conventional wisdom posits that externally advised real estate investment trusts (REITs) and 
listed property companies significantly underperform their internally advised counterparts due 
to the additional agency costs engendered by such organizational arrangements. This widely 
held belief is based on two empirical observations: 1) since 1990 nearly 90 % of U.S. REITs 
have been internally advised, and 2) early performance comparisons between internally and 
externally advised REITs find evidence that externally advised REITs underperform.1 , 2 
Additionally, the belief that the hiring of an external advisor increases agency costs is 
consistent with Holmstrom (1999), who asserts that a firm will find it harder to extract effort 
from an agent with a market contract than from an employee. With the conventional wisdom 
suggesting that all REITs and listed property companies should be internally advised, we are 
left to wonder why after 20 years of competition 10 % of U.S. REITs remain externally advised. 
Furthermore, why are a substantially larger fraction of international REITs and listed property 
companies externally advised?3 This paper provides an economic rationale for why some real 
estate companies rationally choose external advisement. 
A number of important findings within the literature suggests the need for this type of 
examination. First, as noted above, extant theory is unable to explain the persistent survival of 
the approximately 10 % of U.S. REITs that maintain external advisement. If external 
advisement only increases agency costs without offering some offsetting benefit we would 
expect externally advised REITs to be competed out of existence.4 Second, as the 
international real estate markets have continued to evolve and expand over the past decade, it 
has become readily apparent that the strong proclivity toward internal advisement appears to 
be a uniquely U.S. phenomenon. Third, theoretical observations by Sun (2010) show that 
contingent upon market conditions and viable contracting options, external advisement may 
actually reduce agency problems via enhanced monitoring of individual portfolio advisors, 
reputational capital effects, or efficiency gains.5 Fourth, a variety of recent studies suggest that 
local investors possess value relevant soft information, which provides them with an advantage 
when trading in local markets.6 To the extent external advisement allows REITs or similarly 
structured real estate companies to capture this local knowledge, external advisement may 
represent a relatively efficient form of organizational design for some firms. Consistent with this 
notion, Cashman and Deli (2009) find that foreign mutual funds tend to locate portfolio 
management with foreign advisors when investing in countries where local information is likely 
to be more valuable. 
Previewing our results, we find Asia-Pacific REITs and listed property companies are more 
likely to hire an external advisor when they invest in countries: 1) that are more economically 
and politically unstable, 2) whose legal system is based on civil law, 3) where the level of 
corruption is perceived to be high, and 4) when disclosure is relatively poor. Additionally, we 
find the probability of retaining an external advisor is directly related to the associated agency 
costs. Finally, we find significant return premiums in excess of 13 % accruing to firms that have 
an organizational structure consistent with their investment profile. Thus, we conclude the 
decision to hire an external advisor represents a trade-off between the agency costs 
associated with hiring an external advisor and the benefits associated with capturing local soft 
information. Additionally, we argue that the external advisement decision should be viewed as 
a strategic decision for the organization. These conclusions, while unique within the context of 
the existing academic literature, are consistent with the views held by many international real 
estate analysts and practitioners. For example, Austrade (2010) reports: “The use of internal or 
external management of the property assets is also a strategic decision for AREIT managers. 
Both methods are commonly used in the market with the key decision being cost efficiency and 
local knowledge (p. 17).” 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. “Previous Literature” section outlines 
relevant studies in both the existing real estate and mutual fund literatures which examine the 
decision to outsource portfolio selection decisions. “Empirical Expectations” section motivates 
our empirical hypotheses, while “Data and Sample Construction” section describes the sample 
dataset and methodologies we employ to evaluate our core hypotheses. “Analysis” section 
presents the details, results, and interpretations of our empirical analysis. Finally, “Conclusion” 
section summarizes our key findings and concludes. 
Previous Literature 
The Role of Real Estate Advisors 
REIT and real estate company advisors function much like a mutual fund advisor, 
implementing the strategy determined by the sponsoring firm.7 Therefore, the advisor is 
charged with a broad range of activities including property acquisition and disposition decisions 
as well as identifying, hiring, and firing property managers and other related service providers, 
in accordance with the sponsor’s desired strategy. Within Asia-Pacific markets, REITs and 
other listed property companies typically specify an investment strategy at the time of fund 
raising, and identify and retain the advisor after these decisions have been made. It is our 
understanding that unlisted property companies within these same markets may well exhibit 
considerably more variation in organizational design along this dimension, with advisor 
selection helping to drive investment decisions for many of these private firms. To the extent 
that advisor selection practices may differ across market segments, our results may not be 
readily generalizable to the private market. 
Prior to 1986, in the United States, REITs were statutorily prohibited from retaining in-house 
advisory services. After the IRS private letter rulings of 1986 effectively opened the door to 
alternative organizational arrangements for REIT advisement, the industry rapidly and 
dramatically evolved to the extent that by 1990 nearly 90 % of REITs had elected to be 
internally advised. This shift was widely viewed as an industry-wide attempt to avoid the 
additional agency concerns engendered by external advisors. 
Consistent with the notion that external advisement creates significant agency problems within 
real estate markets, early empirical studies of U.S. REIT organizational design reported large 
performance differences between internally and externally advised REITs. For example, Howe 
and Shilling (1990) find internally advised REITs outperformed their externally advised 
counterparts by 7 % during their sample period. Similarly, Capozza and Seguin (2000) find an 
8 % disparity in their study, while Ambrose and Linneman (2001) suggest these differences 
result from the significantly higher cost structures they document for externally advised REITs.8 
Taken together, these results suggest external advisement engenders non-trivial agency costs 
for U.S. REITs and listed property companies. 
However, as noted above, the fraction of American REITs that retain external advisors has 
remained relatively unchanged over the past 20 years. If internal advisement represents a 
uniformly superior approach to organizational structure, then in a competitive marketplace 
such as that faced by publicly traded real estate firms in the United States, these relatively 
inefficient externally advised REITs should be competed out of existence. The continued 
observation of this relatively stable fraction of the market anecdotally suggests some offsetting 
benefit(s) must be associated with external advisement. 
Turning our attention abroad, we note that international real estate markets do not exhibit the 
same proclivity toward internal advisement observed in the U.S. REIT market. As illustrated in 
Table 1, over 30 % of Asia-Pacific REITs and listed property companies outsource their 
advisement, with particularly high concentrations of firms doing so in Japan (77.1 %) and 
Singapore (41.2 %). Even Australia (17.9 %) and Hong Kong (14.8 %) based real estate 
companies exhibit external advisement rates well in excess of that observed in the United 
States.9 The key question thus becomes, what benefit(s) does external advisement offer these 
firms? We next turn to the mutual fund literature for key insights into this issue. 
Table 1  
External advisement rates by country 
Country 
















Australia 28 17.9 % 28 17.9 % 28 17.9 % 
Hong 
Kong 27 14.8 % 37 10.8 % 35 11.4 % 
Japan 35 77.1 % 35 77.1 % 35 77.1 % 
Singapore 34 41.2 % 35 40.0 % 37 37.8 % 
Other 31 6.5 % 20 10.0 % 20 10.0 % 
Total 155 33.5 % 155 33.5 % 155 33.5 % 
This table provides information on the frequency with which Asia-Pacific REITs and listed property companies hire 
external advisors to facilitate their portfolio selection and management decisions 
Collocating Decision Rights: Monitoring Versus Information Acquisition 
Cashman and Deli (2009) find that a mutual fund’s decision to hire a sub-advisor is driven by 
the trade-off between the increase in the potential agency costs associated with hiring a sub-
advisor, and the costs associated with lost investment opportunities because the advisor lacks 
value relevant soft information. Applying these findings to real estate markets, we argue that a 
real estate company’s decision to hire an external advisor will also reflect this trade-off 
between the costs of external advising and its associated benefits. Following Stein (2002), we 
define soft information as any value relevant information that is difficult to transfer. 
With respect to real estate, soft information acquisition may take a variety of forms. For 
example, a boots-on-the-ground local presence engendered by external advisement may allow 
the agents to more easily visit the property, physically inspect and assess its condition and 
surrounding neighborhood, and directly interact with tenants and related stakeholders rather 
than only reading about the property or gaining access to information through alternative 
secondary sources.10 Additionally, as noted by Shen et al. (2012), international real estate 
markets and property values remain heavily influenced by local cultures and customs. These 
dimensions of investment value are typically not readily “accessible and transparent to outside 
investors (p. 395).” As such, outsourcing advisement of investment decisions to firms with 
superior knowledge of, or access to, value relevant dimensions of local customs and cultures 
may well materially reduce the costs of due diligences, as both the time and money necessary 
to satisfactorily complete information collection processes should be reduced. 
Continuing, local agents (i.e., external advisors) with an established presence within a given 
market may well have institutional knowledge of obscure, yet value relevant aspects of 
individual property transactions, back stories, and counter-party risk. For example, suppose a 
devout, Shariah compliant investor wishes to buy/sell a commercial property from/to an 
international real estate firm. Local experts, such as external advisors, may well be more likely 
to possess the relevant knowledge of this potential counter-party’s transaction history and 
personal back story. Thus, local experts may be more successful at quickly and profitably 
structuring a deal which complies with the unique demands and expectations of local 
investors.11 Back story details or transaction histories may also be tremendously important with 
respect to properties and locations as well as counterparties. Similarly, local market experts 
may help alleviate the anchoring biases and high search costs which have been shown by 
both Miller et al. (1988) and Lambson et al. (2004) to drive out-of-market buyers to materially 
over-pay for residential real estate.12  
Finally, given the highly localized nature of many real estate markets, local soft information 
may be particularly value relevant to development activities within this market sector. For 
example, location specific planning and zoning rules, appeal processes, and variances may 
well be more transparent to local experts. Emerging building code trends with respect to green 
building standards, growth corridors, impact fees and other socio-political trends may also be 
more accessible and transparent to experienced local market participants. Together, these 
examples illustrate only a small fraction of the myriad of potential mechanisms through which 
local market insiders may obtain informational advantages over their more distant 
counterparts.13  
Consistent with the above view that locals possess soft information and our assertion that 
external advisors are hired because of access to such local soft information, we identify the 
geographic headquarters location of each of the external advisors retained by firms within our 
sample. Of the 52 external advisors retained by sample firms, 51 are headquartered and have 
a major physical presence in the country where the plurality or majority of the firm’s investment 
properties are physically located.14 The lone exception is Starhill Global REIT, which is both 
headquartered and listed in Singapore. They have retained the advisory services of YTL 
Pacific Star REIT Management, also a Singapore based firm, to handle the implementation of 
the firm’s investment strategy. Starhill holds a diversified portfolio of 13 retail and office 
properties, currently valued at approximately S$2.7 billion ($2.1 billion U.S.), across five 
countries—Australia, China, Japan, Malaysia, and Singapore. While the firm actually owns 
more properties in Japan (seven) than any other country, the self-reported market value of 
their Singapore holdings (two landmark properties on the world famous Orchard Road) 
represents 68.3 % of their estimated total property portfolio value.15  
Empirical Expectations 
All else equal, we expect REITs and listed property companies will prefer internal advisors to 
external advisors. As outlined by Chan et al. (2003), external advisors are less likely to focus 
on maximizing shareholder wealth, thus internal advising is associated with lower agency costs 
than external advising. Furthermore, we expect that when contracts are enforceable, thereby 
reducing the agency costs associated with hiring an external advisor, real estate firms will be 
more likely to retain an external advisor. Additionally, when the value of soft information is 
greater, thereby increasing the benefits of collocating decision rights with local soft information, 
we expect that firms will be more likely to have a local presence (i.e., hire an external advisor). 
With this in mind, we argue the decision to hire an external advisor is driven by the trade-off 
between the additional agency costs associated with external advisement, and the value of the 
local soft information such arrangements allow the REIT, or listed property company, to 
capture and utilize. 
Throughout our analysis, we acknowledge that the agency costs associated with an external 
advisor will vary based upon the unique profile of the countries in which the real estate 
company invests. We proxy for the agency costs associated with external advising via the 
Morck et al. (2000) governance index. This index represents a combination of several different 
governance indices designed to measure the risk of: a) corruption, b) expropriation, and c) 
repudiation within a given market. Higher values of the Morck, Yeung, and Yu index indicate a 
better contracting environment. Specifically, we argue a better contracting environment lowers 
the agency costs associated with hiring an external advisor, and further that this reduction in 
agency costs should increase the likelihood that REITs and listed property companies will hire 
an external advisor.16  
After controlling for the agency costs associated with retaining an external advisor, we posit 
that hiring an external advisor has the potential to align decision rights with value relevant soft 
information. To investigate this hypothesis, we employ four alternative proxies for the value of 
local soft information and the potential benefit of hiring an external advisor. 
First, we assert that when a country is politically and/or economically unstable, the rapidly 
changing nature of the market inherently dictates that the value of local soft information will be 
higher, as the rapidly changing market implies opportunities will likely appear and disappear 
quickly. Firms with access to local soft information should be better positioned to seize these 
opportunities. As such, the corresponding value of lost investment opportunities for firms 
without access to location specific soft information will be higher. To measure the political and 
economic stability of each firm’s investment portfolio we use a portfolio weighted average of 
the Euromoney country risk index.17 Specifically, for each firm contained within our sample we 
identify the geographic (country) location of each property they hold within their investment 
portfolio. The fraction of each firm’s portfolio invested in a given country is then multiplied by 
the corresponding Euromoney country risk index value to estimate our firm specific political 
and economic stability score. As property value estimates are often unavailable, country 
weights are based upon the number of properties located within each jurisdiction.18 As higher 
values for this index correspond to expectations of greater stability, we expect an inverse 
relationship between our country stability index and the probability of external advisement. 
Second, as secure and clearly defined property rights provide the foundation for investment 
valuation, we also control for the origin of each country’s legal system. Djankov et al. (2003), 
La Porta et al. (2004), and La Porta et al. (2008a, b) all note that judicial systems founded on 
the underlying tenants of British common law are generally superior to judicial systems based 
on (Roman and French) civil law with regards to protecting and securing property rights and 
enforcing legal contracts. As such, countries with civil law based legal systems tend to have 
larger unofficial economies. This implies that the value of missed opportunities from not 
empowering agents possessing local soft information with decision rights will be larger in 
countries where the legal system is based on the traditions of civil law. Therefore, we 
anticipate REITs and other listed property companies will be more likely to employ external 
advisors, who we expect to possess local soft information, as the fraction of their portfolio 
invested in countries with civil law based legal systems increases. To examine this possibility, 
for each firm we again create property weighted indices that are designed to measure the 
percentage of each firm’s investment holdings subject to legal regimes built upon the 
foundations of civil law. As we do not have access to market value information for all properties 
contained within sample firm investment portfolios, our risk metrics are again property 
weighted as opposed to value weighted. Based upon the arguments above, we expect a 
positive relationship between our civil law index measure and the probability a firm retains 
external advisement. 
Third, we similarly note that when making real property investments it becomes critically 
important to understand the intricacies of the local business, legislative, and regulatory 
processes. In corrupt markets, external advisors with a physical presence become uniquely 
important. Specifically, local knowledge of the idiosyncratic processes and potential pitfalls of 
investing becomes increasingly important, as it potentially mitigates the possibilities for 
expropriation. This implies that as the level of corruption increases, the value of the 
opportunities lost by not collocating decision rights with the agent possessing the relevant local 
soft information increases. In addressing this issue, we follow Cashman and Deli (2009) and 
measure each firm’s exposure to corruption using a long-run average of the Transparency 
International Corruption Perception Index (TICPI).19 Once again, each firm’s corruption value is 
calculated using a property weighted investment portfolio average of the perceived corruption 
index across the countries in which the firm holds investment assets. As higher values indicate 
less corruption, we anticipate a negative relationship between each firm’s probability of 
employing an external advisor and their investment portfolio’s average corruption index. 
Fourth and finally, high quality disclosure can facilitate information transfer, which likely 
reduces the value of local soft information. Conversely, low quality disclosure is likely to hinder 
information transfer, thereby increasing the value of local soft information. As traditional 
sources of information become less transparent, firms are forced to look for alternative sources 
of information, which may include hiring external advisors. Following Jin and Myers (2006), we 
proxy for the quality of disclosure using the Global Competitiveness Report.20 As with each of 
our previous index metrics, the Global Competitiveness index score for each firm represents 
their property weighted portfolio average. As higher values indicate more, or better, disclosure, 
we anticipate the decision to employ an external advisor will be negatively related to our 
disclosure index. 
Data and Sample Construction 
We begin our empirical analysis by identifying all REITs and listed property companies tracked 
by SNL financial that trade on the Australian Stock Exchange, Bombay Stock Exchange, Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange, New Zealand Exchange Limited, Singapore Exchange, or Tokyo Stock 
Exchange.21 A complete list of the firms in our sample, organized by country of incorporation, 
is provided in Appendix 1. We next identify the nature of each firm’s advising (internal versus 
external). SNL determines whether the firms it covers are self-advised (internal) or not 
(external). More specifically, SNL considers a firm to be self-advised if “the company provides 
its own asset management services” or the firm shares common ownership with the advisor. 
For example, consider the firm described in Fig. 1. ABC Real Estate Companies owns a 
majority of XYZ Asset Management Co., and is also the parent company of both ABC Property 
Management Inc. and ABC REIT. If ABC REIT hires XYZ Asset Management Co. to advise the 
REIT, SNL would classify this organization as self (internally) advised, even though XYZ Asset 
Management Co. is a separate legal entity, as the two organizations share common 
ownership. 
 
Fig. 1 The figure displays a sample organizational structure and how the firm would be classified in terms of 
internal and external advisement 
This classification scheme is also consistent with the prior literature. For example, Cashman 
and Deli (2009) do not consider instances where the reported sub-advisor is owned by the 
advisor or the two share a common owner to be indisputable evidence of the outsourcing of 
decision rights. Specifically, they argue such scenarios are not “clear indications of the transfer 
of portfolio decision rights from one party to another. Consequently, when [examining] the 
allocation of decision rights to a sub-advisor, we are actually examining the allocation of 
decision rights to an unaffiliated sub-advisor.” As such, following both the SNL classification 
system and Cashman and Deli’s (2009) arguments, we only consider instances where advising 
is provided by an unaffiliated third party as indicative of external advisement.22  
Interestingly, some Asia-Pacific countries require REITs to be externally managed. To the 
extent this regulatory paradigm extends into the asset management arena, it also suggests 
that all REITs in those countries may well be externally advised.23 However, based upon SNL 
classifications, this is clearly not the case. To the extent that effective firewalls separate the 
REIT from a subsidiary or related advisor, we are potentially underreporting the frequency of 
external advisement. This would likely bias us against finding empirical support for our focal 
hypotheses. In unreported tests, we reclassify all sample REITs operating in such countries as 
externally advised and find results consistent with those reported using the SNL classification. 
Therefore, to be consistent with the prior literature, we employ the SNL classifications 
throughout all our reported empirical specifications which follow. 
Next we determine the geographic location (country) of every property held within each firm’s 
investment portfolio. As outlined above, we then use these individual investment property 
locations to estimate quantitative measures of each firm’s contracting environment (Morck 
Governance Index) and their firm specific value of local soft information (Country Stability, Civil 
Law Based Legal Origin, Corruption, and Disclosure). Specifically, for firms investing across 
multiple jurisdictions, each organization’s: Morck Governance Index, Country Stability, Civil 
Law Origin, Corruption, and Disclosure measures represent investment property portfolio 
weighted country averages. As noted above, we expect external advisement to be more 
prevalent in the presence of more enforceable contracts, and further, we expect firms to be 
more likely to hire an external advisor when the value of local soft information is higher. 
We complete the construction of our sample dataset by incorporating a number of control 
variables relating to firm specific financial attributes and operating characteristics for each 
sample real estate company. These data were obtained through the SNL financial database, 
and a description of each variable is provided in Appendix 2. Table 2 provides descriptive 
statistics for each of the variables employed throughout our empirical analysis. To highlight a 
few key observations, we first note that roughly one-third of our sample companies (52 out of 
155, or 33.5 %) are externally advised.24 This number is substantially higher than what is 
observed in U.S. markets, and illustrates one key advantage of using the Asia-Pacific region to 
examine our underlying hypotheses regarding the determinants of external advisement. 
Continuing, we next observe that our contracting and information environment metrics all 
exhibit substantial variation across firms. Moving on to firm characteristics, we find some firms 
within our sample invest in properties located exclusively within a single country, while others 
invest in properties in as many as 17 separate nations.25 , 26 Only 27 % of our sample firms 
have formal analyst coverage, while less than 1 in 3 have publicly traded debt outstanding 
which has been rated by Moody’s, S&P, Fitch, or DBRS. Somewhat surprisingly, given this 
relatively limited following, only 6 % of sample firms are characterized by split bond ratings (at 
the notch level). Both inside and institutional ownership levels also exhibit considerable 
variation across firms, though both appear relatively modest compared to the levels observed 
in their U.S. based counterparts. 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum 
Dependent variable 
 Externally advised 155 0.335 0.474 0 1 
Contracting environment 
 Morck governance index 155 25.431 3.098 15.392 28.982 
Soft information metrics 
 Country stability 155 70.463 21.304 37.009 96.377 
 Civil law origin 155 0.364 0.428 0 1 
 Corruption 155 5.908 2.510 2.090 9.298 
 Disclosure 155 0.849 0.099 0.500 1 
Firm specific attributes 
 # of countries 155 2.716 2.855 1 17 
 Pureplay 155 0.497 0.502 0 1 
 Analyst coverage 155 0.265 0.443 0 1 
 Not rated 155 0.703 0.458 0 1 
 Split rating 155 0.058 0.235 0 1 
Income focus 155 0.124 0.113 0.010 0.920 
 Stakeholders & insiders 155 0.387 0.244 0.0001 0.926 
 Institutional ownership 155 0.239 0.164 0.002 0.772 
 Market capitalization 155 2,854.32 6,458.78 0.053 47,286.4 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum 
 Debt ratio 155 0.319 0.159 0 0.984 
 Development 155 0.561 0.498 0 1 
Property type focus 
 Diversified/other 155 0.600 0.491 0 1 
 Retail 155 0.116 0.321 0 1 
 Office 155 0.116 0.321 0 1 
 Hotel/lodging 155 0.084 0.278 0 1 
 Industrial 155 0.045 0.208 0 1 
 Multi-family 155 0.039 0.194 0 1 
This table provides descriptive statistics for all key variables employed throughout the empirical investigation. 
Specifically, information regarding the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values of each attribute 
are reported. Note: market capitalization figures are in millions of U.S. dollars, using exchange rates as of the 
record date of each firm’s financial statements 
Turning to our financial attributes, the average firm in our sample has a market capitalization of 
nearly $3 billion, though this number is highly skewed by a handful of very large, well 
diversified Hong Kong based firms including Swire Pacific Limited, Sun Hung Kai Properties 
Limited, and Cheung Kong Holdings Limited. The median firm within our sample exhibits a 
much more modest market capitalization of approximately $700 million, a figure much more in 
line with their U.S. based counterparts. Debt ratios for our sample of Asia-Pacific property 
companies average slightly over 30 % of total assets, a figure substantively lower than the 
50 % (or higher) values reported for many U.S. based REITs.27 Lastly, we note that 56 % of 
the firms in our sample have an active property development program. Taken together, these 
numbers seem quite reasonable and provide confidence that any empirical relationships we 
observe are unlikely to be driven by data construction anomalies. 
Analysis 
Table 3 begins the empirical investigation by presenting the results of our univariate analysis 
into which real estate companies hire an external advisor. The results presented in this table 
are generally consistent with our a priori expectations. Specifically, we find externally advised 
REITs and listed property companies tend to invest in countries with better contracting 
environments, which is consistent with our expectation that as the contracting environment 
improves the additional agency costs associated with retaining an external advisor are 
diminished. Additionally, we find externally advised real estate companies tend to invest in 
countries where the value of local soft information is greater, regardless of the proxy 
employed. Taken together, these univariate findings offer strong preliminary support for our 
focal propositions. 
  
Table 3 Descriptive statistics and univariate tests 
Variable 
Internally advised Externally advised 
Satterthwaite T-test of differences 
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean 
Contracting environment 
 Morck governance index 103 24.58 52 27.12 −6.55*** 
Soft information metrics 
 Country stability 103 77.78 52 55.96 6.17*** 
 Civil law origin 103 0.24 52 0.61 −5.61*** 
 Corruption 103 6.69 52 4.37 5.37*** 
 Disclosure 103 0.88 52 0.79 5.25*** 
Firm specific attributes 
 # of countries 103 3.14 52 1.88 3.03*** 
 Pureplay 103 0.40 52 0.69 −3.64*** 
 Analyst coverage 103 0.22 52 0.35 −1.57 
 Not rated 103 0.82 52 0.48 4.19*** 
 Split rating 103 0.06 52 0.06 0.01 
 Income focus 103 0.15 52 0.07 6.08*** 
 Stakeholders & insiders 103 0.46 52 0.24 6.71*** 
 Institutional ownership 103 0.21 52 0.30 −3.59*** 
 Market capitalization 103 3,983.7 52 617.3 4.38*** 
 Debt ratio 103 0.29 52 0.37 −3.23*** 
 Development 103 0.64 52 0.40 2.86** 
This table provides mean values and univariate tests of differences in means for all key variables employed 
throughout the empirical investigation disaggregated by the firm’s organizational design. Note: market 
capitalization figures are in millions of U.S. dollars, using exchange rates as of the record date of each firm’s 
financial statements 
A close examination of Table 3 further reveals that internally advised property trusts tend to 
invest in more countries than their externally advised counterparts. This is entirely consistent 
with our expectation that the value of an external advisor decreases with the number of 
countries in which the firm invests. Continuing, internally advised firms also exhibit higher 
insider ownership than externally advised trusts. This is also not surprising, as one key benefit 
of inside ownership is that it helps align insider incentives with those of the investors. With an 
externally advised property company, the need to align the firm’s insiders’ incentives with 
those of investors is clearly mitigated. Additionally, we also note that institutional ownership is 
higher for externally advised REITs and listed property companies than for their internally 
advised peers. This finding is consistent with the notion that institutions serve an important 
function as monitors, and thereby reduce the potential agency costs associated with employing 
an external advisor. 
While univariate measures often provide a meaningful glimpse into underlying economic 
relations, a broader, more robust understanding of these linkages generally requires a 
multivariate context. As such, we next continue our analysis by estimating Logistic regressions 
of the following general form to assess the validity of our key, focal hypotheses: 
• External Advisement = f (Contracting Environment, Information Gains, Firm 
Characteristics, ε). 
The results of these base-case regressions, estimated exclusively over the subset of sample 
firms electing REIT status, are presented in Table 4. We begin by exclusively examining the 
REIT subsample to mitigate any potential identification bias issues associated with a real 
estate firm’s choice of REIT status. As will be demonstrated throughout the subsequent 
empirical analysis, our core, focal results are generally robust to the inclusion of non-REIT 
listed real estate companies. When interpreting the results, we also note that the intercept term 
represents the probability that a benchmark firm hires an external advisor. By construction, the 
benchmark firm in our sample dataset has all continuous variables set to their respective mean 
values, and all indicator variables set equal to zero. The reported coefficients reflect the 
change in the probability that the benchmark firm hires an external advisor given a one 
standard deviation increase (from its mean) in a continuous variable, or an indicator variable 
switches from zero to one. The primary variables of interest in this analysis are our measure of 
the cost associated with hiring an external advisor (Morck Governance Index) and our four 
measures of the value of local soft information. 
Table 4 Determinants of external advisement for Asia-Pacific real estate companies 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.902 0.632 0.844 0.409 
Contracting environment 
 Morck governance index 
0.082** 0.332** 0.133** 0.479** 
(4.89) (5.21) (4.79) (4.58) 
Soft information metrics 
 Country stability 
−0.673**       
(4.42)       
 Civil law origins 
  0.351*     
  (3.70)     
 Corruption 
    −0.621**   
    (4.59)   
 Disclosure 
      0.072 
      (0.18) 
Firm specific attributes 
 # of countries 
0.015 −0.082 0.052 −0.075 
(0.02) (0.05) (0.08) (0.17) 
 Pureplay 
0.058 0.330 0.073 0.475 
(0.15) (1.33) (0.10) (1.67) 
 Analyst coverage 
0.010 −0.455 0.008 −0.284 
(0.01) (1.05) (0.01) (0.95) 
 Not rated 
−0.888* −0.632* −0.840* −0.409** 
(3.20) (3.53) (3.71) (4.86) 
 Split rating −0.902** −0.632* −0.844** −0.409** 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(4.00) (3.15) (3.96) (4.35) 
 Income focus 
−0.170 −0.361* −0.207 −0.305** 
(1.87) (3.34) (1.73) (4.49) 
 Stakeholders & insiders 
−0.008 −0.061 −0.046 −0.171 
(0.01) (0.05) (0.08) (0.67) 
 Institutional ownership 
−0.255 −0.459 −0.396 −0.292 
(0.98) (1.18) (1.32) (1.51) 
 Market capitalization 
−0.370 −0.410 −0.585 −0.395* 
(0.79) (0.80) (1.44) (3.54) 
 Debt ratio 
−0.560** −0.578*** −0.616*** −0.383** 
(4.66) (6.79) (7.33) (5.63) 
 Development 
0.079 0.316 0.124 0.475 
(0.76) (1.53) (0.94) (2.46) 
Property type controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 75 75 75 75 
Psuedo-R2  0.6068 0.6013 0.5949 0.5454 
This table presents the results of four logistic regressions investigating the reasons why Asia-Pacific REITs 
choose to retain external advisors. Each model regresses the firm’s choice of organizational form (externally 
advised equals one, zero otherwise) against measures of the benefits associated with collocating portfolio 
decision rights with location specific soft information, the contracting environment faced by the firm, and an array 
of firm specific control variables. Specifically, soft information benefits are measured using our investment 
portfolio weighted Country Stability Index in Model (1), exposure to judicial systems originating from the tenants of 
Civil Law in Model (2), Corruption Perceptions Index in Model (3), and Clarity of Disclosure Index in Model (4) 
*** Indicates statistical significance at 1 % level, ** Indicates statistical significance at 5 % level, * Indicates 
statistical significance at 10 % level 
Examining the results in Table 4, we first note the consistently significant positive relation 
between our Morck Governance Index and the likelihood a sample REIT retains an external 
advisor. Across the four models, the coefficients range from 0.082 to 0.479 and suggest a one 
standard deviation improvement in the relevant contracting environment of the firm’s 
investments increases the firm’s probability of retaining an external advisor by 9.1–117 %.28 
This result is entirely consistent with our a priori expectations outlined above, and the 
theoretical forcing contracts argument developed by Sun (2010). 
Continuing on to our soft information measures, in model 1 we see that as the political and 
economic stability of the countries in which the REIT holds investment assets increases, the 
firm is less likely to hire an external advisor. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in 
country stability reduces the probability that the firm hires an external advisor by 74.6 %.29 In 
model 2, we observe that the relation between investing in countries with legal systems based 
on civil law and the use of an external advisor is both directionally consistent with our 
expectations and (marginally) statistically significant. In terms of economic import, a one 
standard deviation increase in our Civil Law Origins information metric is associated with a 
55.5 % increase in the probability that the firm will retain an external advisor. Continuing on to 
model 3, we next observe that as the REIT invests in less corrupt countries, the firm is less 
likely to hire an external advisor. A one standard deviation increase in the corruption index, 
which corresponds to a reduction in the average level of perceived corruption, reduces the 
probability that the firm hires an external advisor by 73.6 %. Finally, in model 4 while our 
disclosure metric exhibits an unexpected positive sign, the coefficient estimate is not 
statistically significant. As such, we offer no additional commentary on this result. 
Taken together, these results provide relatively strong and robust support for the contention 
that a REIT’s decision to hire an external advisor is driven by the trade-off between the 
additional agency costs engendered by this organizational structure and the value of local soft 
information the external advisor may possess or acquire. As such, these results provide 
evidence of a potential offsetting benefit to the long recognized increased agency costs 
associated with retaining an external advisor, and further, provide a rationale and justification 
for the continued existence of, and international proclivity towards, external advisement for 
REITs. 
Robustness 
To this point in the analysis we have focused exclusively on REITs. Thus, to generalize our 
results across broader commercial real estate markets requires the implicit assumption that all 
real estate firms respond to the trade-off between potential agency costs and information gains 
in an equivalent manner. More specifically, we have implicitly ignored both operational and 
regulatory differences between REITs and those listed real estate companies which have not 
(or cannot) elected REIT status. For example, in many Asian countries listed property 
companies operate primarily as real estate development companies, while REITs may be 
legally limited in their exposure to such activities.30 Additionally, we have lumped internally 
advised firms which perform their own valuations together with those firms which are internally 
advised but outsource specific functions which materially influence investment decisions to 
third parties. Table 5 investigates the robustness of our core results by re-estimating our base 
model regressions across four alternative data specifications. Specifically, in Panel A we first 
broaden our sample to include not only REITs, but also listed property companies from across 
the Asia-Pacific region that are either unable, or unwilling, to elect REIT status. This 
specification offers the potential for increased estimation power, as well as additional insight 
into the broader generalizability of our results. Reassuringly, our core findings are qualitatively 
robust to the inclusion of non-REIT, real estate firms. More specifically, across all four model 
specifications in Panel A, and consistent with both expectations and our previously reported 
REIT specific results, our Morck Governance Index (Contracting Environment Metric) 
continues to be significantly positively related to the probability of external advisement for Asia-
Pacific real estate firms. Similarly, in Models 1–3 our soft information metrics continue to retain 
their expected (and previously reported) signs, though our legal foundations metric is no longer 
statistically significant. On the other hand, in Model 4 our disclosure metric now exhibits a 
statistically significant (and expected) negative sign, suggesting either the enhanced power 
attributable to the additional observations allows us to now statistically identify our 
hypothesized relationship, or alternatively that REITs and listed property companies are 
differentially sensitive to the opacity of firm disclosures. 
  
Table 5 Determinants of external advisement: robustness analysis 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: REIT and non-REIT, choice of external advisement 
Contracting environment 
 Morck governance index 
0.198*** 0.089*** 0.191*** 0.324*** 
(8.16) (8.17) (8.51) (9.00) 
Soft information metrics 
 Country stability 
−0.414*       
(2.80)       
 Civil law origins 
  0.052     
  (0.71)     
 Corruption 
    −0.438*   
    (3.17)   
 Disclosure 
      −0.299* 
      (3.17) 
Headquarters controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Property type controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 155 155 155 155 
Psuedo-R2  0.8714 0.8631 0.8722 0.8748 
Panel B: REIT and non-REIT, Choice of external advisement (Broad definition) 
Contracting environment 
 Morck governance index 
0.219** 0.194** 0.216** 0.247** 
(4.17) (6.10) (3.90) (4.19) 
Soft information metrics 
 Country stability 
−0.335**       
(3.88)       
 Civil law origins 
  0.187**     
  (4.52)     
 Corruption 
    −0.195   
    (1.30)   
 Disclosure 
      −0.127 
      (1.74) 
Headquarters controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Property type controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 155 155 155 155 
Psuedo-R2  0.6219 0.6251 0.6090 0.6129 
Panel C: non-development subsample, choice of external advisement (Broad definition) 
Contracting environment 
 Morck governance index 0.207* 0.211* 0.315* 0.341** 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(3.65) (3.63) (3.60) (4.73) 
Soft information metrics 
 Country stability 
−0.272       
(0.80)       
 Civil law origins 
  0.220     
  (1.95)     
 Corruption 
    −0.015   
    (0.01)   
 Disclosure 
      −0.167 
      (1.46) 
Headquarters controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Property type controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 68 68 68 68 
Psuedo-R2  0.7563 0.7720 0.7485 0.7626 
Panel D: development subsample, choice of external advisement (Broad definition) 
Contracting environment 
 Morck governance index 
0.042 0.011** 0.566 0.131 
(0.62) (4.00) (2.50) (2.18) 
Soft information metrics 
 Country stability 
−0.021**       
(5.87)       
 Civil law origins 
  0.011**     
  (5.03)     
 Corruption 
    −0.187**   
    (4.61)   
 Disclosure 
      −0.625** 
      (4.18) 
Headquarters controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Property type controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 87 87 87 87 
Psuedo-R2  0.7351 0.6616 0.7144 0.6847 
This table presents the results of logistic regressions investigating the reasons why Asia-Pacific REITs and listed 
property companies choose to retain external advisors (Panel A). Panels B-D examine the decision to retain 
external advisement and/or independent third-party property appraisers. Each model regresses the firm’s advisory 
choice against measures of the benefits associated with collocating portfolio decision rights with location specific 
soft information, the contracting environment faced by the firm, and an array of firm specific control variables. 
Specifically, soft information benefits are measured using our investment portfolio weighted Country Stability 
Index in Model (1), exposure to judicial systems originating from the foundational tenants of Civil Law in Model 
(2), Corruption Perceptions Index in Model (3), and Clarity of Disclosure Index in Model (4) 
*** Indicates statistical significance at 1 % level, ** Indicates statistical significance at 5 % level, * Indicates 
statistical significance at 10 % level 
 Continuing to Panel B, we next expand our definition of externally advised firms to include both 
those organizations which have explicitly retained external advisory firms as well as those who 
have retained the ongoing services of third party professional appraisal firms to assist with 
their valuation of investment properties. These appraisal firms, which typically are not directly 
responsible for making individual investment property decisions, do materially influence the 
process through their valuations. As such, a foreign firm which hires a local appraisal company 
may well be able to capture value relevant soft information we have previously attributed 
exclusively to external advisors.31 Information on the retention of such property appraisal 
professional firms is obtained directly from the SNL Financial database. This alternative 
definition increases the frequency of externally advised sample firms (both REITs and non-
REIT listed property companies) from 52 of 155 (33.5 %) as reported in Table 2, to 87 of 155 
(56.1 %). Once again, our focal results are qualitatively robust to the selection of either 
dependent variable definition. More specifically, our contracting environment metric continues 
to be significantly positively related to the probability of retaining an external advisor, while all 
four soft information metrics once again exhibit their hypothesized sign. Interestingly, two of 
these four soft information metrics (Country Stability and Civil Law Origins) exhibit enhanced 
statistical significance under this broader external advisement definition, while the other two 
(Corruption and Disclosure) are now marginally insignificant. Nonetheless, we view these 
results as being generally consistent with the notion that a firm’s contracting environment and 
information environment both materially influence its optimal organizational design. 
Continuing with our robustness analysis, panel C of Table 5 presents results focused 
exclusively on those REITs and listed property companies which do not have active property 
development programs and/or pipelines in place. For these firms, their primary source of 
income depends critically on their ability to collect and/or monetize cashflows from financial 
contracts. As such, the enforceability of such legal instruments should be of particular 
importance, and thus, we would expect the organizational structure of these firms to be 
uniquely responsive to the contracting environments of the local market area(s) in which they 
invest. Consistent with these expectations, we find organizational choice decisions for these 
non-development firms to be significantly related to our Morck Governance Index metric. 
Specifically, our results suggest that as the contracting environment faced by a REIT or listed 
real estate company improves (i.e., contracts become more enforceable), the agency costs 
associated with hiring an external advisor decline, and thus the probability of outsourcing 
advisement increases. 
Conversely, panel D of Table 5 examines those REITs and listed property companies with an 
active, ongoing development program or pipeline. For this subset of firms, we expect access to 
local, soft information to be uniquely important in facilitating the identification and development 
of real property investment opportunities, substantively increasing the value of soft information. 
Consistent with this notion, all four soft information proxies are statistically significant and 
suggest both REITs and listed property companies are more likely to retain external 
advisement when the value of local, soft information increases. 
Given the findings presented throughout Table 5, a legitimate question arises as to the 
endogeneity of firm choice of REIT status, development activities, and the external advisement 
decision. To further explore this issue, Table 6 once again re-estimates our base case, logistic 
advisor choice regressions, this time employing the Cashman and Deli (2009) framework for 
mitigating endogeneity concerns. Specifically, much like two (Panel A), or three (Panel B), 
stage least squares (2SLS/3SLS), preliminary logistic regressions explaining firm decisions to 
elect REIT status, and then separately to participate in development activities, are estimated. 
Predicted values from these preliminary regressions are then included in the advisory choice 
models as additional independent variables to help orthogonalize the parameters of interest. 
Table 6 Determinants of external advisement: endogeneity controls 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: 2SLS 
Intercept 0.739 0.779 0.688 0.837 
Contracting environment 
 Morck governance index 
0.144* 0.134** 0.167* 0.154*** 
(3.35) (3.84) (3.04) (7.24) 
Soft information metrics 
 Country stability 
−0.364**       
(5.33)       
 Civil law origins 
  0.141**     
  (5.10)     
 Corruption 
    −0.235   
    (2.23)   
 Disclosure 
      −0.512** 
      (6.29) 
Firm specific attributes 
 Predicted REIT 
−0.064 0.048 −0.057 −0.655* 
(0.19) (0.20) (0.11) (4.72) 
Headquarters controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Property type controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 155 155 155 155 
Psuedo-R2  0.6227 0.6260 0.6095 0.6355 
Panel B: 3SLS 
Intercept 0.629 0.848 0.682 0.882 
Contracting environment 
 Morck governance index 
0.180a  0.093b  0.175* 0.112*** 
(2.68) (2.56) (2.93) (7.13) 
Soft information metrics 
 Country stability 
−0.384**       
(5.31)       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Civil law origins 
  0.127**     
  (5.99)     
 Corruption 
    −0.236   
    (2.30)   
 Disclosure 
      −0.490** 
      (6.20) 
Firm specific attributes 
 Predicted dev. 
−0.074 −0.219 0.027 −0.029 
(0.21) (1.63) (0.04) (0.13) 
 Predicted REIT 
−0.152 −0.097 −0.032 −0.693** 
(0.39) (0.36) (0.02) (4.07) 
Headquarters controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Property type controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 155 155 155 155 
Psuedo-R2  0.6237 0.6339 0.6097 0.6361 
This table presents the results of logistic regressions investigating the reasons why Asia-Pacific REITs and listed 
property companies choose to retain external advisors and/or independent third-party property appraisers. Panel 
A presents a 2SLS model, which controls for the predicted probability that the fund chooses REIT status. Panel B 
presents a 3SLS model controlling for both the predicted probability that the fund chooses REIT status, and the 
predicted probability that the fund engages in development activities. Each model regresses the firm’s advisory 
choice against measures of the benefits associated with collocating portfolio decision rights with location specific 
soft information, the contracting environment faced by the firm, and an array of firm specific control variables. 
Specifically, soft information benefits are measured using our investment portfolio weighted Country Stability 
Index in Model (1), exposure to judicial systems originating from the foundational tenants of Civil Law in Model 
(2), Corruption Perceptions Index in Model (3), and Clarity of Disclosure Index in Model (4) 
*** Indicates statistical significance at 1 % level, ** Indicates statistical significance at 5 % level, * Indicates 
statistical significance at 10 % level. a represents a p-value of 0.102. b represents a p-value of 0.109 
Examining these results, we once again find the firm’s contracting environment to be 
significantly related to the probability a firm outsources their advisement, with more 
enforceable contracts increasing a firm’s willingness to retain external advisors.32 Similarly, our 
four soft information proxies all retain their expected signs across both panels, with our country 
stability, legal foundation, and disclosure metrics all exhibiting enhanced significance relative 
to our results presented in Table 4.33 Taken together, we view Tables 5 and 6 results as 
indicative that REITs and listed property companies may well face different regulatory 
environments and operating constraints. However, the underlying agency cost versus 
information acquisition trade-off paradigm which drives the advisor choice decision is robust 
across both REIT versus non-REIT organizations and development versus non-development 
firms. 
Consequences of Advisor Choice 
Finally, in Table 7 we examine the outcomes associated with the advisor choice decision. 
Given the international nature of our sample, it becomes difficult to specify a traditional multi-
factor model such as Fama and French (1993) or Carhart (1997). As such, following Dempsey 
et al. (2012) we model a real estate company’s expected return as a function of its operating 
characteristics, and include fixed-effect controls for year and country of origin.34 The time and 
location fixed effects effectively control for market wide returns, while the firm characteristics 
control for potential systematic differences in return patterns across divergent firm profiles such 
as size and income focus. Abnormal returns are measured as the residual from this expected 
return regression. In Panel A, we show that our sample companies are not able to earn 
abnormal returns, and provide descriptive statistics associated with firm performance. 
Table 7 Performance differences across observable firm organizational characteristics 
Panel A: abnormal return characteristics of sample REITs and listed property companies 
  Mean Median Max Min   
Abnormal 
return 0.000 0.011 1.353 −1.731   
Panel B: operating versus development firms 
  Obs. Operating Obs. Development Satterthwaite T-test of Difference 
Abnormal 
return 67 −0.014 85 0.011 −0.40 
Panel C: NonREIT versus REIT firms 
  Obs. NonREIT Obs. REIT Satterthwaite T-test of Difference 
Abnormal 
return 78 0.017 74 −0.018 0.56 
Panel D: internally versus externally advised firms 
  Obs. Internally Advised Obs. Externally Advised Satterthwaite T-test of Difference 
Abnormal 
return 101 0.019 51 −0.038 1.04 
Panel E: predicted to be internally versus externally advised firms 
  Obs. Expected Internally Advised Obs. 
Expected Externally 
Advised 
Satterthwaite T-test of 
Difference 
Abnormal 
return 103 0.017 49 −0.036 0.95 
Panel F: matched versus non-matched organizational form and investment profile 
  Obs. Not Matched Obs. Matched Satterthwaite T-test of Difference 
Abnormal 
return 8 −0.130 144 0.007 −1.85* 
This table provides performance comparisons of Asia-Pacific REITs and listed property companies across 
organizational characteristics. In panel A, we provide basic characteristics of our expected return model 
estimation. In panel B, we examine return differences between operating and development firms. Panel C 
examines the return differences between Non-REIT real estate firms and REITs. In panel D, we examine return 
differences between internally and externally advised real estate companies. Panel E examines the return 
difference between those firms we predict should be externally advised, and those we predict should be advised 
internally. Finally, in panel F, we examine return differences between firms whose organizational form matches 
their investment profile and those which do not 
Throughout this paper we argue that the decision to hire an external advisor represents a 
trade-off between the additional agency costs associated with an external advisor and the 
value of capturing local soft information. We also note that in a competitive market, competition 
should weed out firms that make relatively inefficient operating decisions, including those 
related to the selection of organizational design. As such, we expect that REITs and listed 
property companies will tend to organize themselves in a relatively efficient manner. Therefore, 
if firms are indeed making appropriate decisions with regard to organizational design there 
should be no observable differences in performance based upon participation in development 
activities, REIT status, or type of advisor employed by the firm. In Panels B-E we test for such 
performance differences across observable firm organizational characteristics. Examining the 
results, we are unable to detect a statistically significant difference between the performance of 
real estate operating versus real estate development firms, REITs versus other listed real 
estate companies, or internally advised REITs and listed real estate companies versus their 
externally advised peers (on either a realized or predicted basis). While these results could be 
due to a lack of power in our tests, or limitations with our expected returns model, they are also 
consistent with our central hypothesis that firms are choosing their organizational structures in 
a relatively efficient manner. 
Finally, we also examine the predictive power of our model. If we are correct that the decision 
to hire an external advisor is a significant, value relevant decision for the firm, and furthermore 
that our model accurately predicts the appropriate organizational form based upon the agency 
cost versus information acquisition trade-off facing each firm, then we would expect firms 
acting in accordance with our predictions to outperform firms that do not. To examine this 
notion that firms which select the “correct” organization form outperform those which do not, 
we first classify all firms in our sample as being either matched or non-matched. A matched 
firm is one whose organizational structure is consistent with empirical expectations. 
Specifically, we average each firm’s likelihood of retaining an external advisor using 
predictions from all four regression models contained in Table 5 Panel A. If the average 
probability of hiring an external advisor is greater than 50 % and the firm is indeed externally 
advised, it is consider to be correctly advised (matched). If the average probability of hiring an 
external advisor is less than 50 % and the firm is internally advised, it is also considered to be 
correctly advised (matched). Firms that are externally advised and have an average probability 
of external advisement less than 50 %, or those that are internally advised and have an 
average probability of external advisement greater than 50 %, are considered to be incorrectly 
advised (non-matched). 
Using this methodology, we find only 8 firms in our sample are not correctly advised.35 This 
result illustrates the strong predictive power of our advisor choice models, as we are able to 
correctly classify approximately 95 % of our sample observations. Furthermore, we find 
significant underperformance associated with these 8 “non-matched” firms. Specifically, they 
provide abnormal returns 13 % below expectations, while our “matched” firms outperform 
expectations by 0.7 %. In sum, these findings demonstrate that the advisory choice decision 
has significant implications for the firm. Furthermore, these results are consistent with our 
modeling of the decision to hire an external advisor as a trade-off between the increased 
agency costs of such structures and the value of the local soft information the external advisor 
possesses or allows the firm to capture. 
Conclusion 
In this paper we explore decisions by Asia-Pacific REITs and listed property companies to hire 
an external advisor. To date, this decision has received relatively scant attention in the 
academic literature, primarily because conventional wisdom posits that all such property 
companies should be internally advised due to the increased agency costs associated with 
retaining an external advisor. Consistent with this wisdom, we find that firms choose not to hire 
an external advisor when the agency costs associated with doing so are relatively high. 
However, contrary to conventional wisdom, we also find robust evidence that hiring an external 
advisor can be beneficial, allowing the real estate company to access and act on local soft 
information, thereby enhancing its performance. 
Specifically, we find that the probability of retaining an external advisor is positively related to 
our Morck Governance Index, suggesting such arrangements are more likely when contracts 
are more easily enforceable. Furthermore, after controlling for the contracting environment, we 
find REITs and listed property companies are more likely to hire an external advisor when: 1) 
political and economic instability increases, 2) they invest more heavily in countries with legal 
systems rooted in the traditions of civil law, 3) they invest in locations characterized by high 
perceptions of corruption, and 4) they invest in countries requiring relatively limited or opaque 
corporate disclosures. Finally, we also present evidence that firms which appropriately align 
their organizational structures to balance the trade-off between agency costs and the soft 
information benefits associated with external advisement are rewarded in the marketplace with 
higher returns. 
In summary, we find the external advisement decision is more complex than is typically 
recognized by the existing literature. Specifically, hiring an external advisor may well be a 
relatively efficient organizational design choice for many Asia-Pacific REITs and listed property 
companies, particularly those investing in market sectors where the value of local soft 
information is higher. Thus, the internal versus external advisor choice decision by Asia-Pacific 
REITs and listed property companies should be viewed as a value relevant, strategic decision 
for the firm. 
Footnotes 
1 In 1986, the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued private-letter rulings which first 
authorized internal advisement of REITs. After these rulings, the vast majority of existing REITs 
converted to internal advising, while most newly formed enterprises likewise organized 
themselves in this fashion. 
2 See, for example, Howe and Shilling (1990), Capozza and Seguin (2000), and Ambrose and 
Linneman (2001). 
3 See Chan et al. (2003) for historical data on internal advisement frequencies. As to current data, a 
cursory review of North American real estate companies tracked by SNL financial reveals only 
19 of 171 (or 11.1 %) covered REITs and 3 of 34 (or 8.8 %) covered non-REIT real estate 
operating companies are currently externally advised—data as of February 22, 2011. The use of 
Asia-Pacific markets provides the dual benefit of both increased variation in the organizational 
design of sample firms and allows us to use country based measures of soft information: 
country stability, legal environment, corruption, and disclosure. 
4 See, for example, Alchian (1950). 
5 Sun (2010) observes that external advisement could lead to heterogeneous productivity, but argues 
the direct causes of such productivity differences are not obvious. This paper examines several 
potential sources of such productivity advantages. 
6 See, for example, Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001), and Cashman and Deli (2009). 
7 See Chan et al. (2003) for an extensive discussion of the role of REIT advisors. 
8 Additional related studies examining REIT performance across alternative organizational forms 
include Cannon and Vogt (1995), who find self-administered REITs outperform their advisor-run 
REIT counterparts, and Wei et al. (2001), who find captive REITs exhibit higher costs of capital 
than their non-captive counterparts. 
9 We note that only 11 firms in our sample choose to incorporate, are headquartered, and list their 
shares in different geographic markets. These firms are: Asia Standard International Group 
Limited, Century City International Holdings Limited, Far East Consortium International Limited, 
Great Eagle Holdings Limited, Guocco Leisure Limited, HKR International Limited, Hongkong 
Land Holdings Limited, Mandarin Oriental International Limited, Paliburg Holdings Limited, 
Regal Hotels International Holdings Limited, and Shangri-La Asia Limited. 
10 This example is similar to Chen et al. (2010) example of soft information in the mutual fund industry. 
They contend the ability to talk to a firm’s CEO versus only reading the firm’s financial reports 
provides locally based mutual funds with value relevant soft information. 
11 See, for example, Lin and Yung (2006), Girard and Hassan (2008), Ibrahim and Ong (2008), and 
Ibrahim et al. (2009) for further information and details on Shariah compliance and Islamic 
investment in real estate. 
12 We do note that both Myer et al. (1992) and Turnbull and Sirmans (1993) fail to find evidence of 
price premiums paid by out-of-market buyers. 
13 Empirical evidence that local market investors have access to superior information may also be 
found in Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001), Dvorrak (2005), Choe et al. (2005), and Ivkovic and 
Weisbenner (2005). 
14 By contrast, only 75 % of sample firms are incorporated in the country in which they most heavily 
invest. 
15 See www.starhillglobalreit.com. 
16 Our following empirical results are robust to the selection of alternative agency cost indices such as 
those suggested by La Porta et al. (2008a, b). 
17 See http://www.euromoney.com/poll/10683/PollsAndAwards/Country-Risk.html for complete details 
on the construction and limitations of this index. We mitigate the influence of annual deviations 
in the index by averaging each country’s score over the preceding decade. 
18 One could reasonable expect that both the agency costs and the value of soft information in the 
country where the real estate firm is located may impact the decision to hire an external advisor. 
We argue that while the contracting environment where the firm is located could potentially be 
as important as where the properties are located, the value of soft information would be less 
important. The firm would want to be sure that the contract is enforceable on both ends, while 
the value of soft information is location specific and only valuable where the firm is investing. In 
untabulated tests we find results consistent with these arguments. Specifically, when using 
agency cost and soft information metrics based solely upon the headquarters location, country 
of incorporation, or trading venue of each firm rather than our portfolio weighted metrics, the 
Morck et al. (2000) governance index results are consistent with our reported findings, while our 
soft information proxies are not statistically significant. 
19 See http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010 for complete details on 
the construction and limitations of this index. 
20 See http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2010-11.pdf for complete 
details on the construction and limitations of this index. 
21 We start with a sample of 198 real estate firms followed by SNL, but then lose 43 observations 
because of data limitations. Specifically, we lose 15 observations because of missing ownership 
data, 6 observations due to missing debt ratios, and 22 observations because of missing soft 
information proxies. 
22 We readily cede the notion that our classification system will potentially under (over) identify 
externally (internally) advised organizations. We do not view this as overly problematic, as any 
systematic misspecification along this dimension should bias us against finding empirical 
support for our focal hypotheses. 
23 See Luo (2008), Tan (2009), and Brounen and Koning (2012) for additional detail and insight into 
cross-country variation in REIT regulations across the Asia-Pacific region. 
24 We acknowledge that firms operating in multiple markets and/or countries may rationally choose to 
retain multiple external advisors. We do not view this as a major issue with this analysis as the 
economics underlying the decision to hire multiple external advisors should be similar to those 
underlying the basic outsourcing decision. 
25 Note, the median firm in our sample invests in only 2 countries, while City Developments Limited 
invests across 17 different nations. Furthermore, our contracting environment and soft 
information metrics, which become increasingly computationally intensive as the number of 
countries increase, are designed to implicitly capture many important aspects of the 
international diversification of each firm’s investment holdings. Nonetheless, given the wealth of 
existing literature suggesting that geographic proximity may well influence firm level decision-
making and performance, we feel it is also important to explicitly control for the number of 
countries (jurisdictions) across which an individual firm invests. See, for example, Coval and 
Moskowitz (1999), Choe et al. (2005), Dvorrak (2005), and Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) for 
additional insight into international diversification, geographic proximity, and firm performance. 
26 One may reasonably expect that property sector strategies may materially influence the geographic 
diversification patterns of many real estate firms’ investment holdings. In un-tabulated results, 
we explore this possibility and fail to find evidence of significant differences between the 
average number of countries in which firms invest across property sector strategies. 
27 See, for example, Feng et al. (2007), Boudry et al. (2010), and Harrison et al. (2011). 
28 In model 1 the benchmark firm exhibits a 90.2 % probability of hiring an external advisor. If the firm’s 
investment portfolio property weighted average contracting environment index increases by one 
standard deviation, the probability of hiring an external advisor increases to 98.4 % 
(0.902 + 0.082 = 0.984), a 9.1 % rise. Similarly, in model 4 the benchmark firm exhibits a 40.9 % 
probability of external advisement. A one standard deviation improvement in the firm’s 
contracting environment increases this probability to 88.8 % (0.409 + 0.479 = 0.888), a 117 % 
increase. 
29 The benchmark firm has a 90.2 % probability of hiring an external advisor. If the country risk of the 
firm’s investment portfolio increases by one standard deviation, the probability of hiring an 
external advisor falls to 22.9 % (0.902–0.673 = 0.229), a 74.6 % drop. 
30 Specifically, Australian REITs may only participate in development activities for the purposes of 
deriving rental income, Singapore REIT portfolios may invest a maximum of 10 % of their total 
assets in uncompleted non-residential property and are prohibited from investing in vacant land, 
while Hong Kong REITs are prohibited from participating in development activities or investing 
in vacant land. For extended discussions of REIT regulatory differences across countries in the 
Asia-Pacific region see Ooi et al. (2006), Luo (2008), Tan (2009), and Brounen and Koning 
(2012). 
31 We acknowledge that many, if not most, REITs and listed property companies will retain the 
services of local appraisers to provide comprehensive market, site, and neighborhood analysis 
before completing individual transactions. We view these one-off, pay-for-service deals as 
materially different from firms which retain the ongoing services of, and publicly disclose the 
identity of, a dedicated professional property appraisal advisory firm. We view these latter 
service providers as roughly the equivalent of external advisors along the valuation dimension, 
and throughout these robustness tests treat them accordingly. 
32 We note this relationship, while robust across all four models in Panel A, is only statistically 
significant at conventionally accepted levels in models 3 and 4 of Panel B. However, as our 
empirical results in models 1 and 2 are extremely close to attaining statistical significance, and 
in fact do so in alternative model specifications, we have also chosen to report associated p-
values for these two parameter estimates. 
33 These results are not altogether surprising given both the superior econometric methodology and 
the enhanced statistical power attributable to the increased number of sample observations in 
Table #6. 
34 Specifically, our expected return model is: Return = f (# of Countries, Pureplay, Analysts, Not-Rated, 
Split, Income Focus, Stake & Inside, Institution, Market Cap, Debt Ratio, GAAP, Property Focus 
Dummies, Country of Origin Dummies, Time Fixed Effects, ε). We lose three observations in 
these models as we are unable to find performance data for these three REITs. 
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Appendix 1 Asia-Pacific Real Estate Companies 
AUSTRALIA  
Abacus Property Group (I) 
Aspen Group (I) 
Astro Japan Property Trust (I) 
Australand Property Group (I) 
Bunnings Warehouse Property 
Trust (I) 
Carindale Property Trust (E) 
Centro Properties Group (I) 
Centro Retail Group (I) 
Sunlight Real Estate Investment Trust 
(I) 
Swire Pacific Limited (X) 
Wharf (Holdings) Limited (I) 
JAPAN  
AEON Mall Co., Ltd. (I) 
Daibiru Corporation (I) 
Daiwa Office Investment Corporation 
(E) 
Frontier Real Estate Investment Corp. 
(E) 
Fukuoka REIT Corporation (E) 
First Real Estate Investment Trust 
(E) 
Fortune REIT (E) 
Frasers Centrepoint Trust (E) 
Frasers Commercial Trust (E) 
GuocoLand Limited (X) 
Ho Bee Investment Limited (X) 
Hotel Properties Limited (X) 
Keppel Land Limited (X) 
K-REIT Asia (E) 
CFS Retail Property Trust (I) 
Challenger Diversified Property 
Group (E) 
Charter Hall Group (I) 
Charter Hall Office REIT (I) 
Charter Hall Retail REIT (I) 
DEXUS Property Group (E) 
EDT Retail Trust (I) 
FKP Property Group (I) 
Goodman Group (I) 
GPT Group (I) 
ING Industrial Fund (E) 
ING Office Fund (E) 
Lend Lease Corporation Limited (I) 
Mirvac Group (I) 
Stockland (I) 
Sunland Group Limited (I) 
Thakral Holdings Group (I) 
Tishman Speyer Office Fund (I) 
Valad Property Group (I) 
Westfield Group (I) 
HONG KONG  
Champion Real Estate Investment 
Trust (E) 
Cheung Kong Holdings Limited (X) 
Global One Real Estate Investment 
Corp. (E) 
Hankyu REIT Inc. (E) 
Heiwa Real Estate Co., Ltd. (I) 
Industrial & Infrastructure Fund Inv. Co. 
(E) 
Invincible Investment Corporation (E) 
Japan Excellent, Inc. (E) 
Japan Hotel and Resort, Inc. (E) 
Japan Logistics Fund, Inc. (E) 
JAPAN OFFICE Investment 
Corporation (E) 
Japan Prime Realty Investment Corp. 
(E) 
Japan Real Estate Investment 
Corporation (E) 
Japan Rental Housing Investments Inc. 
(E) 
Japan Retail Fund Investment 
Corporation (E) 
MID REIT, Inc. (E) 
Mitsubishi Estate Co., Ltd. (E) 
Mitsui Fudosan Company Limited (I) 
Mori Hills REIT Investment Corporation 
(E) 
MORI TRUST Sogo Reit, Incorporation 
(E) 
Nippon Accommodations Fund Inc. (E) 
Nippon Building Fund Incorporation (E) 
Lippo-Mapletree Indonesia Retail 
Trust (I) 
Mapletree Logistics Trust (E) 
Overseas Union Enterprise Limited 
(X) 
Parkway Life REIT (E) 
Singapore Land Limited (X) 
Stamford Land Corporation Limited 
(X) 
Starhill Global REIT (E) 
Suntec Real Estate Investment 
Trust (E) 
United Industrial Corporation 
Limited (I) 
UOL Group Limited (I) 
Wheelock Properties (Singapore) 
Limited (X) 
Wing Tai Holdings Limited (I) 
OTHER  
Ackruti City Limited (I) 
Ansal Properties & Infrastructure 
Limited (I) 
Asia Standard International Group 
Ltd (X) 
Asian Hotels (North) Limited (I) 
Century City International Holdings 
Ltd (I) 
DLF Limited (I) 
Far East Consortium International 
Ltd (X) 
China Overseas Land & Investment 
Ltd (X) 
Chinese Estates Holdings Limited 
(I) 
Hang Lung Group Limited (X) 
Hang Lung Properties Limited (X) 
Harbour Centre Development 
Limited (X) 
Henderson Land Development Co. 
Ltd (X) 
Hongkong and Shanghai Hotels, 
Limited (X) 
Hopewell Holdings Limited (X) 
Hysan Development Company 
Limited (X) 
Kerry Properties Limited (X) 
Kowloon Development Company 
Limited (X) 
Lai Sun Development Company 
Limited (I) 
Link Real Estate Investment Trust 
(E) 
MTR Corporation Limited (I) 
New World China Land Limited (X) 
New World Development Company 
Ltd (X) 
Pacific Century Premium Dvlpmnts 
Ltd (X) 
Prosperity Real Estate Investment 
Trust (E) 
Regal Real Estate Investment Trust 
(E) 
Nomura Real Estate Office Fund, Inc. 
(E) 
NTT Urban Development Corporation 
(I) 
ORIX JREIT Inc. (E) 
Premier Investment Corporation (E) 
Shoei Co., Ltd. (I) 
Sumitomo Realty & Development Co. 
Ltd. (I) 
Tokyu Land Corporation (I) 
Tokyu REIT, Inc. (E) 
Top REIT, Inc. (E) 
United Urban Investment Corporation 
(E) 
SINGAPORE  
AIMS-AMP Capital Industrial REIT (E) 
Allgreen Properties Limited (X) 
Ascendas India Trust (I) 
Ascendas Real Estate Investment Trust 
(I) 
Ascott Residence Trust (E) 
Banyan Tree Holdings Limited (X) 
Cambridge Industrial Trust (E) 
CapitaCommercial Trust (E) 
CapitaLand Limited (X) 
CapitaMall Trust (I) 
CapitaMalls Asia Limited (X) 
CDL Hospitality Trusts (E) 
Ganesh Housing Corporation 
Limited (I) 
Goodman Property Trust (E) 
Great Eagle Holdings Limited (X) 
GuocoLeisure Limited (I) 
HKR International Limited (X) 
Hongkong Land Holdings Limited 
(X) 
Hotel Leelaventure Limited (I) 
Housing Devel. & Infrastructure Ltd 
(I) 
Indiabulls Real Estate Limited (I) 
Indian Hotels Company Limited (I) 
Kiwi Income Property Trust (E) 
Mahindra Lifespace Developers 
Limited (I) 
Mandarin Oriental International 
Limited (I) 
Omaxe Limited (I) 
Orbit Corporation Limited (I) 
Paliburg Holdings Limited (I) 
Parsvnath Developers Limited (I) 
Peninsula Land Limited (I) 
Puravankara Projects Limited (I) 
Regal Hotels International Holdings 
Ltd (I) 
Royal Orchid Hotels Limited (I) 
Shangri-La Asia Limited (X) 
Shenzhen Investment Limited (I) 
Sino Land Company Limited (X) 
Sun Hung Kai Properties Limited 
(X) 
City Developments Limited (I) Sobha Developers Limited (I) 
Unitech Limited (I) 
The following table contains a list of all sample firms by country of incorporation. Information 
identifying whether each firm is internally advised (I), externally advised (E), or internally 
advised with a related professional property appraisal firm (X) is also included. 
Appendix 2 Variable Definitions 
Morck Is the property weighted average of the Morck et al. (2000) governance index 
-Higher values indicate a better contracting environment 
Country 
stability 
Is the property weighted average of the Country Risk Index published by Euromoney 
-Higher values of the index indicate a more stable environment 
Civil law origin Is the percent of properties located in countries with a civil law based legal origin 
Corruption Is the property weighted average of the Corruption Perception Index published by Transparency 
International 
-Higher values of the index indicate less perceived corruption 
Disclosure Is the property weighted average of the Global Competiveness Report 
-Higher values indicate more/better disclosure 
# of countries Is the number of countries in which the REIT or listed property company holds investment 
properties 
Pureplay Is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the REIT or listed property company invests exclusively 
within a single country, and is set to 0 otherwise 
Analysts Is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the REIT or listed property company has 1 year forward 
looking estimates of funds from operations (FFO) available through either the First Call or FactSet 
databases, and is set to 0 otherwise 
Not-rated Is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the REIT or listed property company does not have rated 
debt outstanding, and is set to 0 otherwise 
Split Is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the REIT or listed property company has outstanding debt 
rated by two or more rating agencies, with competing ratings that differ by at least one notch, and 
is set to 0 otherwise 
Income focus Is the ratio of total operating revenue to total assets 
Stake & inside Is the SNL Financial reported stakeholder and insider ownership percentage 
Institution Is the SNL Financial reported institutional ownership percentage 
Market cap Is the REIT or listed property company’s reported market capitalization in U.S. dollars with 
exchange rates based upon the record date for the firm’s financial statements 
Debt ratio Is the ratio of the REIT or listed property company’s total debt to its total assets 
Development Is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the firm has an active development plan, and is set to 0 
otherwise 
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